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A B S T R A C T   
Notwithstanding their crucial role in ecosystem functionality, large carnivores generally entail economic costs to 
hunters due to competition for the same prey. This cost could potentially vary depending on carnivore density 
and the game hunting values at stake. We estimate a hedonic price model applying the unconditional quantile 
regression method in order to investigate the impact of large carnivores along the distribution of hunting lease 
prices in Sweden. We compare these impacts with those obtained from conditional quantile regressions, as well 
as from ordinary least squares estimations. Based on the unconditional quantile estimates, our results indicate 
that wolf, lynx and bear can exert a negatively significant effect in the middle range of the outcome distribution, 
while no significant impact is found in the lower quantiles. For the statistically significant quantiles, the average 
marginal implicit price of an additional wolf territory in the study area is around 3.35 million Swedish kronor 
(SEK) per year, namely 358 thousand Euros (EUR). This corresponds to an annual reduction in the mean hunting 
lease price per hectare by 21% in the municipality where the territory is established. Similarly, an additional lynx 
family group entails an average marginal implicit price of SEK 3.55 million (EUR 379 thousand) per year, and an 
additional brown bear individual entails an average marginal implicit price of nearly SEK 110 thousand (EUR 
11.6 thousand) per year. The corresponding impact on the mean hunting lease price per hectare is a reduction by 
22.4% and 0.6% for an additional lynx family group and an additional brown bear individual, respectively, in the 
municipality where the establishment occurs. Results can be useful for policies targeting the spatial distribution 
of large carnivores.   
1. Introduction 
The conservation of viable large carnivore populations in human- 
populated areas has engendered major challenges and public debate 
for wildlife management and biodiversity conservation (Treves et al., 
2006; Chapron et al., 2014). Carnivore-human coexistence has given rise 
to social, economic and political conflicts, which require balancing local 
concerns for the potential negative effects of carnivores with societal 
apprehensions towards saving endangered species (Sjölander-Lindqvist 
et al., 2015). Conflicts occur insofar carnivores predate on livestock, 
hence affecting farmers and reindeer herders (Treves et al., 2006; 
Widman and Elofsson, 2018), and the magnitude of livestock damages 
vary with carnivore and livestock density (Widman and Elofsson, 2018). 
Moreover, large carnivores negatively affect hunters by reducing the 
game available to harvest, which in turn decreases landowners’ revenue 
from leasing out their property to hunting activities 
(Sjölander-Lindqvist, 2015; Mensah et al., 2019; Lozano et al., 2020). 
The impact on hunting activities can be expected to vary, given that 
large carnivores exert a differential effect on game species’ abundance 
contingent on the population density of carnivore and prey species 
(Sand et al., 2012), and depending on the productivity of the ecosystem 
(Melis et al., 2009). 
In order to address the variations in large carnivore-human conflicts 
across space, carnivore policies often include some kind of zoning, 
which aims to reduce the spatial overlap between large carnivores’ 
distribution areas and affected human activities (Linnell et al., 2005). 
Such separation can be achieved by for example control of carnivore 
population density outside the designated carnivore zone, or removal of 
the potentially conflicting activities from carnivore range. The desig-
nation of carnivore zones is usually made with an aim to minimize 
livestock damages and human-safety issues (Linnell et al., 2005; Skogen, 
2015; EPA, 2014a,2014b,2014c), but the impact on hunting activities is 
not taken into account. However, the economic impact of carnivores on 
hunting activities can be large compared to that on the livestock sector 
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(Mensah et al., 2019). Moreover, there are often strong linkages between 
carnivores’ impact on hunting activities, and attitudes to carnivore 
conservation among people in rural areas (Skogen, 2015). Therefore, 
ignoring the variation in carnivore impact on hunting activites could 
undermine acceptance of carnivore zoning policies, and thus increase 
the risk that carnivore conservation goals are not met. 
In the earlier economic literature on large carnivores, some empirical 
studies estimate the average (Asheim and Mysterud, 2004; Bostedt and 
Grahn, 2008) or average marginal (Mensah et al., 2019) cost per 
carnivore due to livestock and game depredation; while Widman and 
Elofsson (2018) measure the variation in marginal cost across regions. 
However, no earlier study has recognized that the impact of a given 
carnivore species on hunting could vary across different market price 
segments. This is a shortcoming, as there are strong indications that the 
market for hunting leases is segmented, with contracts between land 
owner and hunters varying with the scope, scale, duration, and condi-
tions for hunting (Lundhede et al., 2015; Mensah and Elofsson, 2017). 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how the marginal impact of 
large carnivores on hunting lease prices in Sweden varies across 
different segments of the hunting lease price distribution. We conjecture 
that a varying impact along the price distribution could be expected due 
to the variations in impact of carnivores on prey species, and the vari-
ation in the demand for hunting. Identification of conditions where the 
impact on lease prices is high, indicating that the hunting-carnivore 
conflict is particularly strong, is important from a policy perspective 
as wildlife managers have the explicit task to undertake measures to 
avoid such conflicts. Knowledge on the variation in impact on hunting 
lease prices is also valuable for policy decisions on targets for the 
geographical distribution of large carnivores. 
To analyze whether the economic impact of carnivores on hunting 
values differs across multiple valuation segments we apply the quantile 
regression (QR) framework. This framework is used to estimate the 
marginal effect of an explanatory regressor across different segments of 
the dependent variable in order to provide more detailed information on 
the variation in impact of the explanatory variable (Koenker and Hal-
lock, 2001). Economic studies have applied the conditional quantile 
regression (CQR) approach to find heterogeneous effects in the response 
variable (Koenker and Basset, 1978), with several applications to he-
donic valuation of environmental goods and bads such as, e.g., envi-
ronmental amenities on farmland (Uematsu et al., 2013), flood risk 
(Rajapaksa et al., 2017), and wildfires (Mueller and Loomis, 2014). In 
these studies, the marginal effects are generally compared with the 
average effect across the whole price distribution yielded by ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimations. However, when estimating CQR, the 
quantiles and thus the interpretation of the coefficients vary once 
explanatory variables are added to (or removed from) the model (Porter, 
2015). As a result, unconditional quantile regression (UQR) has become 
increasingly used as a more appropriate method for hedonic studies to 
address policy relevant questions in the presence of multiple covariates 
(Firpo et al., 2009; Borah & Basu, 2013; Peeters et al., 2017). UQR es-
timates can be interpreted in a similar fashion as OLS in the sense that 
the effect on each quantile can be generalized to the entire (quantile) 
population, and the interpretation of the coefficients is not conditional 
on the values of the covariates. Because we are interested in the mar-
ginal impact of carnivores on different segments of the overall distribu-
tion of hunting lease prices, the unconditional quantile method provides 
a more suitable technique than CQR and OLS. In addition, we adopt a 
functional form of the hedonic price function in which marginal implicit 
prices can be determined for each unconditional quantile irrespective of 
the values taken by the dependent variable, i.e. the lease price, within 
the quantile. 
Our analysis reveals heterogeneity in the marginal effect of large 
carnivores on hunting lease prices. Results show that the largest impact 
occurs in the percentiles close to the median, whereas the lower tail of 
the lease price distribution is presumably unaffected by any of the three 
species. 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we propose and 
develop the estimation of the hedonic-price model by applying the 
quantile regression framework. Section 3 describes the data of the study. 
Section 4 presents the estimation results and marginal implicit prices for 
each carnivore species, and Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
Quantitative information aimed at facilitating the reading and inter-
pretation of the empirical results is provided in an appendix at the end of 
the paper and in the supplementary material. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Proposed empirical model 
Hedonic pricing is a revealed preference method that has been 
widely used to decompose the prices of a property or good into its 
constituent characteristics (Rosen, 1974; Taylor, 2003). In a competitive 
market, consumers maximize utility by bidding the minimum price for 
each characteristic, while sellers try to ask for the profit maximizing 
price (Livengood, 1983; Lundhede et al., 2015). Thus, the market 
equilibrium is reached when bid and offer prices converge (Palmquist, 
1989). In Sweden, more than 300 000 hunters have invested about EUR 
50 million per year in hunting (Mattson et al., 2008); therefore, the 
Swedish hunting lease market is sufficiently large to assume sellers 
(landlords) and bidders (hunters) to be lease price takers. The bidding 
price that hunters are willing to pay arises from the maximization of a 
utility function that includes attributes primarily related to harvest 
success and hunting experience (Messonier and Luzar, 1990; Zhang 
et al., 2006). The selling price asked by landowners comes from the 
profit maximization that accounts for hunting site attributes, diversity of 
game species and the costs of the services provided (Pope and Stoll, 
1985; Lundhede et al., 2015). Hence, the equilibrium lease price em-
bodies costs and values for hunters and landowners, and it is determined 
by supply and demand for the use of hunting grounds with various 
constituent attributes (Mensah and Elofsson, 2017). 
We formulate a hedonic price model to estimate the effect of the 
presence of wolf (Canis lupus), Eurasian lynx (Lynx lynx) and Eurasian 
brown bear (Ursus arctos) on hunting lease prices controlling for other 
attributes: 




+ γG + ε, (1)  
where P is the rental price per hectare paid by a hunting team and Cj is 
the population density of each carnivore species j, with j={wolf, lynx, 
brown bear}. The carnivore index Cj is taken in logarithm plus one unit, 
in order to avoid undefined values for those hunting areas without 
carnivore population (Cj = 0). G is a vector of attributes that, according 
to the literature, influence hunting lease prices from the demand or 
supply side (Livengood, 1983; Zhang et al., 2006; Little and Berrens, 
2008; Lundhede et al., 2015; Mensah and Elofsson, 2017; Lozano et al., 
2020): Size of the hunting area, number of team members, human 
population density in the municipality, distance to the nearest biggest 
city1, municipality income per capita2, land ownership (dummy = 1 if 
1 The distance to the largest nearest city is included because the demand for 
hunting grounds is expected to be higher in grounds closer to large urban areas 
(Little and Berrens, 2008). Danish hunters also contribute to the demand for 
hunting plots in Sweden, in particular in the south. The Danish hunters almost 
exclusively enter Sweden via Malmö, hence the distance to large cities accounts 
also for the demand from those.  
2 This covariate accounts for socioeconomic and structural characteristics of a 
municipality. A municipality with higher income can be inferred to produce a 
higher demand for hunting plots, which as a result, can increase the hunting 
lease price (Mensah and Elofsson, 2017). On the other hand, there might be 
fewer alternative recreation opportunities in low income, rural municipalities, 
which could also increase the demand for hunting plots. Hence, the direction of 
the impact is not a priori given. 
J.E. Lozano et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Land Use Policy 101 (2021) 105215
3
the ground belongs to a forest company), carnivore quota, and two 
proxies for the abundance of game; forest productivity and snow depth. 
The two proxies for abundance of game, forest productivity and snow 
depth indicate the potential harvest in the absence of large carnivores3 . 
The use of such proxies instead of bag rates is motivated by the fact that 
bag rates are likely to be negatively affected by the presence of large 
carnivores. Hence, using bag rates in the estimations might substantially 
bias the estimation of the impact of the carnivore abundance variable on 
the hunting lease price. For example, Mensah et al. (2019) show that the 
impact of lynx abundance on hunting lease prices occurs solely through 
the reduction in the bag rate. The inclusion of proxies in the model al-
lows for exclusion of the bag rate without having an omitted variable 
bias. The use of proxies, which follow Lozano et al. (2020), permits us to 
untangle the effect of carnivores from other attributes affecting hunting 
lease prices. 
The first game abundance proxy, snow depth, measures the winter 
severity: intense winters with high snow depth are expected to reduce 
game abundance because of hindered mobility, reproduction and sur-
vival (Mysterud et al., 1997; Lundmark and Ball, 2008). In addition, 
winter conditions may affect ungulate dynamics in the long term. The 
second proxy, forest productivity, relates to habitat conditions affecting 
ungulate game distribution. High-productivity forests with fertile soils 
may increase game abundance because of better habitat conditions for 
wildlife (Bjørneraas et al., 2012; Meilby et al., 2006). The two proxies for 
game abundance are therefore relatively good indicators of the abun-
dance and spatial distribution of moose (Alces alces) and roe deer 
(Capreolus capreolus) in the country, although locally specific habitat 
conditions and the distribution of infrastructure can also matter4 . Both 
moose and roe deer are ungulate game, which are common prey of the 
three carnivores analyzed in this study. Wolf preys mainly on moose 
(Sand et al., 2016), lynx preys primarily on roe deer when available 
(Andrén and Liberg, 2015), and brown bear can often prey on moose 
calves after hibernation (Dahle et al., 1998). The disturbance ε repre-
sents all the uncontrolled characteristics in the model. Finally, α, β and γ 
are parameters to be estimated, of which β is expected to be negative and 
of crucial relevance to this study5 . 
Although the semi-log functional form has been commonly used to 
Fig. 1. (a) Map of Sweden with the distribution of carnivores per region. (b) Distribution of (logarithmic) hunting lease prices (SEK ha− 1 yr− 1) per region. 
Notes: The map pins the municipalities with high population density for each of the carnivore species in the three regions Norrland, Svealand, and Gotaland. The 
markers are based on the carnivore indexes. The density graph on the right hand side illustrates the disparity of hunting lease prices across the different regions. 
Gotaland is the region with highest hunting rental prices and Norrland the cheapest. 
3 One can note that it is common in the literature to use harvest as a proxy for 
game populations (e.g., Cattadori et al., 2003), here we assume the two vari-
ables are strongly correlated. 
4 Reliable and relevant data on habitat characteristics and infrastructure are 
difficult to retrieve from a survey. Another factor that might affect moose 
harvest rates is the moose management regulations, where harvest rates are 
decided upon at the regional level, e.g., for the Moose Managament Areas). 
However in practice, the regulation seems not to be binding given the large 
deviations from targeted harvests in combination with the absence of sanctions 
for noncompliance. 
5 The parameter β is defined for each of the j carnivore species, i.e., the no-
tation should be βj. However, we have removed the subscript j to avoid nota-
tional cluttering in the subsequent expressions. 
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estimate parametric hedonic price models (Livengood, 1983; Hussain 
et al., 2007; Munn and Hussain, 2010), no particular model specification 
has been proven to be superior to another (Owusu-Ansah, 2011). Be-
sides, hedonic theory does not pose constraints on the choice of func-
tional form (Cropper et al., 1988). The specification of Eq. (1) allows us 








This implies that the marginal implicit price is not a function of the 
dependent variable (price) as would otherwise be the case if having a 
log-linear or log-log specification. 
2.2. Model estimation 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) coefficients provide an interpretation 
of the effect of a regressor on the mean of the dependent variable Y. An 
advantage of using OLS is that the law of iterated expectations (LIE) 
allows to measure the impact β of an explanatory variable X on the 
conditional, and also, the unconditional average of the outcome variable 
Y. 
Nevertheless, OLS results cannot be used to explain changes along 
the entire distribution of the dependent variable. If the impact of an 
explanatory variable on the outcome variable is different for different 
segments of the distribution of Y, the use of the conditional quantile 
regression (CQR) seems in principle to be more appropriate (Koenker 
and Bassett 1978). CQR shows the impact of a covariate on different 
quantiles of the dependent variable, however it only provides consistent 
estimates for the conditional distribution of Y. Since the LIE is not 
applicable to the estimates of CQR, the effect β on the τ th conditional 
quantile of the dependent variable cannot be generalized to the popu-
lation level. 
To that extent, unconditional quantile regression (UQR) outperforms 
CQR as it obeys the LIE and allows to find the marginal effect of X on the 
unconditional distribution of the outcome variable irrespective of the 
other covariates. To estimate the UQR we use the method developed by 
Firpo et al. (2009) which defines a transformation of the dependent 
variable on the covariates. This transformation is known as the Influence 
Function (IF) and it is used to calculate the effect of an additional 
observation on the statistic of a specific quantile: 
IF(Y; qτ) =
τ − I(Y ≤ qτ)
fY(qτ)
, (3)  
where qτ is the statistic of the τth quantile, fY(qτ) is the probability 
density function of the outcome variable Y evaluated at qτ, and I(Y ≤ qτ)
is an indicator function equal to 1 if Y ≤ qτ. A re-centered influence 
function (RIF) can be obtained by adding the quantile statistic to the IF: 
RIF(Y; qτ) = qτ + IF(Y; qτ) (4)  
By regressing the conditional expectation of the RIF on the explanatory 
variables X, the RIF model can be viewed as a UQR (Borah & Basu, 
2013): 
E[RIF(Y; qτ)|X ] = mτ(X) (5) 
The marginal effect on the τth unconditional quantile of a small 
change in the distribution of a (continuous) explanatory variable, 







To implement the UQR method with our proposed hedonic price 
model in Equation (1) and find the associated partial effects (i.e. mar-
ginal implicit prices) we proceed as outlined in Firpo et al. (2009). First, 
we estimate the RIF of the τth quantile. Second, we run an OLS regression 
of the estimated RIF6 on the covariates X (known as RIF-OLS regression) 
in order to obtain the estimated βτ coefficients that will allow us to 
calculate the marginal implicit prices for each carnivore7 . 
Based on expression (6), we differentiate the unconditional expec-
tation of the model (1), (mτ(X)), with respect to each carnivore index to 
find the marginal implicit price at the τth quantile. Hence, the marginal 







The only difference between expressions (2) and (7) is that the latter 
corresponds to the (heterogeneous) marginal implicit price per quantile 
whereas the former calculates an average marginal implicit price based 
on the parameter β. In both cases, the marginal implicit prices vary with 
the carnivore population density index Cj. 
3. Data 
Hunting ground specific data were obtained from a survey. The 
sample was randomly selected from the official Swedish Hunters Reg-
istry. Hunters were asked questions on the rental price of the hunting 
ground, the number of members in the hunting team, the size of the 
hunting ground, the hunting bag, and whether the land was owned by a 
forest company or not. The questionnaire further asked questions on 
attitudes to hunting ethics, illegal hunting, wildlife management and 
policy, and wolf conservation. The survey was first sent out by mail in 
May 2016 and was followed by two reminders. To encourage partici-
pation, a hunting trip worth SEK 7 500 (EUR 802)8 was drawn out 
among the respondents. The total number of surveyed hunters was 2014 
and the questionnaire was responded to by 957 hunters (i.e. 47.5% 
response rate). Out of the answered surveys, 323 responded to the 
question on hunting lease price, and were used for the present study. A 
likely reason for the low response rate on the lease price question is that 
prices are seen as private and sensitive information. 
Concerning the hunting lease price (i.e., the dependent variable), the 
survey asked hunters the price per hectare and year (P) that they actu-
ally pay to lease the right to hunt in their most frequented hunting site 
for the 2014/2015 season. Hunting grounds with lease prices reported 
by the respondents are located in 154 municipalities in Sweden out of 
the total 290 municipalities in the country (Fig. A1, Appendix). 
Following experts’ appraisal, we take lease prices above SEK 1 000 per 
hectare and year (93.5 EUR ha− 1 yr− 1) as anomalous observations in the 
dataset. Five survey answers fall beyond this threshold, thus we set these 
observations to the 98th percentile of the data, and perform a 98% 
winsorization in order to reduce the effect of outliers (Rupert, 2006). 
High and low prices of hunting land can be found in all parts of Sweden, 
but there is a tendency for higher prices further south in the country 
(Fig. 1(b)). 
Wolf, lynx and bear presence are measured, respectively, as a pop-
ulation density index in the municipality, earlier used in Mensah et al. 
(2019) and Lozano et al. (2020). Carnivore data was collected from the 
database Rovbase (www.rovbase.no). The main monitoring units are 
6 Because qτ and fY(qτ) are population statistics, they are actually unknown. 
Therefore, the estimated RIF is calculated with the sample statistics: R̂IF(Y;
q̂τ) = q̂τ +
τ− I(Y≤q̂τ)
f̂ Y (q̂τ)
7 For a discussion on the difficulty of extracting marginal quantiles from a 
conditional quantile linear model see Angrist and Pischke (2009) pp. 283.  
8 Exchange rate is 9.35 SEK per EUR, calculated as the average for years 2014 
and 2015 according to Central Bank of Sweden (Sveriges Riksbank). 
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wolf family groups (i.e., a pair with offspring) and pairs (i.e. territorial 
[scent-marking] pairs), and lynx family groups9 (i.e., a female with 
young of the year). The monitoring data consists of coordinates for the 
center point of all observations documented within the monitoring 
program assumed to belong to the same family group or pair (Anon, 
2014; Svensson et al., 2014). The wolf index provides an approximation 
of wolf density by creating buffer zones of 1.000 km2 around the center 
point of a wolf pack (Mattison et al., 2013). A buffer zone includes the 
home range of a wolf territory, i.e. the area where animals frequently 
reside, feed, defend and reproduce. Buffer zones of different wolf packs 
can overlap, and one buffer zone can spread over more than one mu-
nicipality. In order to obtain a measure of wolf presence for each mu-
nicipality, we divide the area of wolf buffer zones by the total area of the 
municipality. Likewise, the lynx index is calculated in a similar fashion 
by creating buffer zones of 320 km2 around the center point of a lynx 
Fig. 2. Quantile plots for the estimated coefficients of (a) wolf, (b) lynx and (c) bear.  
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics (= 323 observations).  
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Hunting lease price Hunting lease price (SEK ha− 1 yr− 1) → Dependent variable  96.68 168.19 0.17 50 1 000  
Hunting lease price (SEK ha− 1 yr− 1) by region:       
Gotaland (South) 153.05 200.78 0.6 100 1 000  
Svealand (Middle) 72.36 113.9 0.38 40 1 000  
Norrland (North) 47.16 147.15 0.17 10.98 1 000 
Area Size of hunting area (hectares, ha) 2 727 6 401.84 4 1 005 80 000 
log(area) Log-transformed size of hunting area 6.89 1.54 1.39 6.91 11.29 
Members Number of hunting team members 18.03 28.39 1 11 350 
log(members) Log-transformed number of members per hunting team 2.55 0.8 0.69 2.48 5.86 
Forest_prod Forest productivity (m3/ha) 6.21 1.62 2.8 6.8 8.3 
Snow_depth Snow depth (m) 0.11 0.14 0 0.05 0.6 
Wolf index Wolf index 0.2 0.45 0 0 2.29 
Lynx index Lynx index 0.16 0.16 0 0.12 0.77 
Bear index Bear index 0.12 0.24 0 0.16 1.73 
Bear_quota Bear quota 17.72 25.88 0 36 67 
Popdens Municipality population density (population per km2) 31.16 32.68 0.2 19.8 176.7 
log(popdens) Log-transformed municipality population density 3.44 3.49 − 1.61 2.99 5.17 
Income_pc Municipality income per capita (SEK 1 000 per year) 51.28 218.86 1.24 13.47 2 415.25 
log(income_pc) Log-transformed municipality income per capita 3.94 5.39 0.22 2.6 7.79 
Distance Distance to the nearest big city (km) 256.68 216.27 21.29 183.98 942.69 
log(distance) Log-transformed distance to the nearest big city 5.55 5.38 3.06 5.21 6.85 
Company Land ownership (dummy = 1 for forest company) 0.26 0.44 0 0 1  
9 One monitored lynx family group represents about 5.48± 0.40 individuals 
(the family group, as well as unmonitored subadults and adult males and barren 
females (Andrén et al., 2006). 
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family group (Aronsson et al., 2016). Hence, the lynx index equals the 
sum of the areas of lynx buffer zones divided by the area of each mu-
nicipality. On the other hand, the brown bear index is not based on 
buffer zones but on the identification of bear individuals from scat 
surveys (DNA inventories), and it reflects the relative bear density in 
each municipality (Kindberg et al., 2011). 
A map of the distribution of the large carnivores can be found in 
Fig. 1. The map shows that the lynx is spread throughout the country, 
while the brown bear is found in the middle and northern parts of the 
country, and the wolf is almost exclusively found in the middle part. The 
spatial distribution of the species is affected by the carnivore manage-
ment policy. Wolves are subject to stringent population control in the 
northern part of the country in order to avoid conflicts with reindeer 
herding (EPA, 2014a), and is often subject to culling in the southern part 
Table 2 
Estimation results for OLS, CQR and UQR with the hunting lease price per hectare and year (SEK ha− 1 yr− 1) as the dependent variable.  
Dependent 
variable: 
OLS Conditional Quantile Regression (CQR) Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR)   
Q_10 Q_40 Q_50 Q_60 Q_90 Q_10 Q_40 Q_50 Q_60 Q_90 
logarea − 39.36** − 7.36** − 9.70*** − 11.98*** − 15.13** − 50.66 − 4.12*** − 5.45** − 11.13** − 14.53*** − 87.66*  
(15.77) (3.48) (2.99) (4.62) (7.10) (34.17) (1.34) (2.74) (4.31) (5.30) (46.43) 
logmembers 18.94 − 0.15 2.23 3.39 4.73 22.62 − 1.22 1.20 1.30 7.24 75.23  
(13.65) (2.68) (2.36) (3.07) (4.81) (21.71) (3.06) (3.55) (5.59) (6.66) (48.05) 
forest_prod 13.79 4.57 10.35*** 15.25*** 13.81*** 30.23 − 1.79 8.71* 22.68*** 27.18*** 42.10  
(9.78) (4.49) (3.27) (3.13) (3.99) (20.48) (2.61) (4.50) (7.24) (7.84) (27.35) 
snow_depth 230.07* 37.42 − 12.86 7.03 37.31 324.01 − 16.02 − 56.64 22.55 56.03 882.25*  
(130.55) (28.53) (25.28) (24.73) (28.87) (231.33) (27.17) (37.39) (56.89) (64.65) (469.41) 
log_(1+wolf) − 70.38*** − 16.80 − 44.02*** − 41.30*** − 39.43*** − 44.43 − 10.10 − 21.04 − 67.61*** − 72.07*** − 131.14  
(20.71) (10.65) (11.33) (12.42) (12.64) (51.34) (8.98) (14.98) (24.38) (23.36) (98.82) 
log_(1+lynx) − 135.92** − 56.39** − 89.51*** − 84.76*** − 72.66** − 117.99 − 6.99 − 42.94 − 159.15*** − 202.95*** − 332.09*  
(65.24) (21.95) (19.89) (21.81) (29.33) (115.34) (17.71) (27.33) (41.37) (46.68) (191.86) 
log_(1+bear) − 27.0592 − 3.79 − 26.12* − 37.05** − 33.98* − 109.82 − 5.60 − 75.90*** − 100.74*** − 87.86*** 30.48  
(41.67) (11.04) (14.37) (14.62) (19.92) (113.76) (21.24) (26.44) (31.99) (30.34) (134.68) 
bear_quota 204.50* 70.23* 59.71 64.06 112.82 963.98* 23.35 62.00 140.68* 154.51 377.18  
(12.88) (40.62) (72.11) (117.26) (165.19) (562.23) (34.73) (62.34) (82.20) (97.78) (770.68) 
log_popdens − 7.33 − 0.74 − 5.90* − 5.54 − 2.93 − 19.74 2.34 − 6.62 − 6.81 − 12.23* 16.85  
(12.18) (3.12) (3.14) (4.16) (5.46) (24.91) (3.06) (4.47) (6.48) (6.63) (35.10) 
log_incomepc 0.64 1.58 − 2.82 − 2.31 2.12 − 6.02 − 0.40 − 2.13 − 1.04 − 1.74 43.73  
(9.39) (2.14) (3.04) (4.11) (5.25) (22.90) (2.20) (3.27) (4.75) (5.52) (28.35) 
log_distance − 44.64 − 9.80 − 10.45* − 4.84 − 17.94 − 57.62 − 0.83 − 18.08*** − 27.86** − 23.21 − 76.99  
(28.71) (7.72) (6.08) (8.29) (12.37) (70.49) (3.51) (6.59) (12.25) (15.31) (70.65) 
forest_company 3.58 − 3.99 4.12 3.11 0.54 − 4.18 − 5.29 − 5.98 − 3.22 12.99 3.55  
(18.78) (5.31) (4.67) (4.16) (4.72) (29.18) (5.37) (6.64) (10.41) (13.43) (44.35) 
_cons 487.08*** 94.80* 146.41*** 104.38 189.22** 628.66 51.79 146.89** 187.98* 181.80 558.89  
(208.63) (56.87) (53.99) (68.53) (92.74) (553.45) (34.35) (61.34) (106.45) (124.15) (582.68) 
Notes: UQR and CQR estimations are obtained with bootstrapped standard errors of 500 replications (shown in parentheses). Standard errors of OLS estimations are 
clustered on a municipality level. 
Fig. 3. Marginal implicit prices in SEK per hectare and year, as a function of additional wolf home ranges, lynx home ranges or bear individuals. The prices apply for 
the municipality where the carnivore home range or individual is established. 
Notes: The continuous and dashed curves correspond to the partial effect obtained from two different unconditional quantiles, 50th and 60th respectively, and the 
dotted line relates to OLS. The different curves for different (unconditional) quantiles reflect the heterogeneous effect of carnivores on lease prices. Moreover, this 
heterogeneity also pertains to the difference between the OLS and UQR curves. As an example, Fig. 3b shows in red font the marginal implicit prices at the median 
quantile that corresponds respectively, to one additional lynx territory, and to two additional lynx territories. 
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of the country due to conflicts with livestock production and 
human-safety concerns. The wolf and brown bear management plans 
both target further dispersal southwards, and the wolf is expected to 
spread more rapidly due to a higher natural dispersal rate (EPA, 2014a, 
2014b). There are no targets for the lynx distribution. 
Information on snow depth and forest productivity was retrieved 
from the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI) and 
The Swedish National Forest Inventory, respectively. The bear quotas 
for the year 2014 are documented in the website of the National Vet-
erinary Institute (SVA). A bear quota is the maximum number of bears 
allowed by the authorities to be killed each hunting season, and it is 
determined based on predictive population growth models, population 
status and conservation goals. Considering that quotas are allocated at 
the county level and some counties are considerably larger than others, 
we control for the size of the counties in relation to the size of the 
hunting ground. 
Income per capita, human population density, and distance from the 
hunting site to the nearest large city (here: Malmö, Gothenburg or 
Stockholm) are variables constructed on a municipality level and 
retrieved based on information in Statistics Sweden. Size of the hunting 
ground, number of hunting team members, income per capita, human 
population density and distance to the nearest biggest city were log- 
transformed to decrease high dispersion. Table 1 presents the descrip-
tive statistics. 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Econometric implications 
For the sake of comparison, we estimate OLS regressions to illustrate 
an average effect of carnivores on lease prices. Then, we proceed with 
CQR and UQR to show the heterogeneity of the impacts of carnivores on 
hunting lease prices notwithstanding that the magnitude and interpre-
tation of the coefficients are different between the two quantile methods 
(Mclean et al., 2013). Both are estimated using bootstrapped errors as in 
Borah and Basu (2013). Our baseline method is the UQR to facilitate the 
interpretation of the carnivore coefficients, and therefore to generalize 
these effects to the population quantiles. However, we also show the 
results of the CQR to compare the dispersion of lease prices within 
different conditional quantiles (Fournier and Koske, 2012), and to 
illustrate the disparity with the UQR estimates. 
UQR coefficients suggest that large carnivores exert a negative and 
significant effect on hunting lease prices in the middle range of the 
overall distribution of hunting lease prices (Fig. 2). At the 5% level of 
significance, the coefficient of the wolf index is negative from the 48th to 
the 77th unconditional quantile, the coefficient of the lynx index is 
negative from the 46th to the 77th, and that of the bear index is negative 
from the 34th to the 65th quantile. Carnivore indexes are not signifi-
cantly different from zero in the lower parts of the distribution. The CQR 
and UQR estimations show that there exists heterogeneity in the impact 
of large carnivores when compared to the mean effect of the OLS esti-
mations (Table 2). Moreover, wolf and lynx indexes in the 50th quantile 
of UQR are highly significant at 1% and near the magnitude of the OLS 
estimates. The bear index is not significant with OLS, but it is highly 
significant for the 50th quantile with UQR. Fig. 2 illustrates the plots per 
carnivore for the entire distribution, and Table 2 presents these results 
for the 10th, 40th, 50th, 60th and 90th quantiles. 
The quantile plots in Fig. 2 illustrate that the confidence intervals of 
the carnivore coefficients become wider in the upper tail of the lease 
price distribution, particularly as of the 80th quantile.10 This is very 
likely due to the relatively small sample size in the carnivore data for 
this upper price segment (Sauro and Lewis, 2016). For the wolf index, 
only 24 non-zero observations out of 107 (i.e., where there is wolf 
presence) are within the 60th-100th quantiles. Similarly for the bear 
index, there are 34 non-zero observations above the 60th quantile (see 
Table A2 in the Appendix). This data limitation makes it difficult to 
identify carnivore effects in the upper-tail of the hunting lease price 
distribution. For comparison, observations with a non-zero lynx index 
are more equally distributed across the prices segments, and the lynx 
coefficient is significant at the 10% level in the 90th quantile of the UQR, 
see Table 2. This finding would still benefit from being replicated with a 
larger sample size. 
We test the null hypothesis of equality of the UQR carnivore coeffi-
cient estimates obtained for different quantiles. For this purpose, we 
proceed as in Peeters et al. (2017). First, we obtain the full covariance 
matrix of the UQR coefficients after running a bootstrapped estimation 
of 500 replications. Then, we run a Wald-F test to determine if the UQR 
coefficient of the median quantile is statistically different from that of 
the 10th quantile (lower tail) on one hand, and that of the 90th quantile 
(upper tail) on the other hand. For the three carnivore indexes, our re-
sults reject the null hypothesis of the coefficients to be equal at the 10th 
quantile and the median, with 5% level of significance (Table A1, Ap-
pendix). This statistical difference across the unconditional quantile 
coefficients confirms the heterogeneous impact of carnivores particu-
larly between the lower and middle range of the price distribution. 
However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality between the 
Table 3 
Marginal implicit prices of one additional carnivore territory or individual for the statistically significant (unconditional) quantiles.  
Carnivore 
species 
Range of unconditional 
quantiles that are 
significant (at 5% level) 
Marginal implicit prices in 
municipality of 
establishment (SEK ha− 1 
yr− 1) 
Average marginal implicit 
price in municipality of 
establishment (SEK ha− 1 
yr− 1) 
Marginal implicit price (million 
SEK territory− 1 yr-1 for wolf and 
lynx, million SEK individual− 1 
yr− 1 for bear) 
Average marginal implicit price per 
year (million SEK territory− 1 yr-1 for 
wolf and lynx, million SEK 
individual− 1 yr− 1 for bear)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Wolf 48th - 77th 14.1 - 26.6 20.3 2.3 - 4.4 3.35 
Lynx 46th - 77th 15.7 - 27.7 21.7 2.6 - 4.5 3.55 
Bear 34th - 65th 0.46 - 0.86 0.66 0.07 - 0.14 0.11 
Notes: Exchange rate is 9.35 SEK per EUR, calculated as the average for years 2014 and 2015 according to Central Bank of Sweden (Sveriges Riksbank). The marginal 
values represent the change in hunting lease prices to an increase from zero to one additional home range (of lynx and wolf) or one additional individual (of bear). In 
column 1, we present the range of quantiles obtained with the UQR method for which the carnivore coefficients are statistically significant with 95% of confidence. 
Column 2 shows the marginal valuations per hectare of hunting ground in an effected municipality that correspond to the quantiles in column 1. Column 3 is the 
average value for the interval in column 2. Column 4 aggregates the marginal values per unit of carnivore territory or individual (i.e., it multiplies the impact per 
hunting ground in column 2 by the area suitable for hunting within an average municipality, that is 165 200 ha). And finally, column 5 is the average value for the 
interval in column 4. 
10 Non-significant results at the extremes are not unusual in hedonic studies 
applying the quantile regression framework (see Peeters et al., 2017, and 
Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins, 2013). 
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90th quantile and the median11. 
Other attributes also exhibit heterogeneous behavior across the 
hunting lease price distribution (Fig. A2 in the Appendix). The coeffi-
cient for the size of the hunting ground (variable log area) is more 
negative the higher the quantile, which implies that the impact of size is 
negatively stronger in the pricier grounds. A possible reason for this 
outcome is that in expensive areas, landowners with smaller hunting 
grounds demand higher payments possibly related to the potential 
damages produced by the hunting team. Forest productivity shows a 
highly significant impact in the middle range of the price distribution. 
Although forest productivity also lacks significance in the uppermost tail 
of the price distribution, the Wald-F test of pairwise equality does not 
yield statistical differences between the UQR coefficients in this segment 
and those in the middle range (Table A1, Appendix). Distance to the 
nearest big city is not significant in the OLS estimation, but the UQR 
method shows differential impacts on hunting leases close to the me-
dian, indicating that urban hunters exhibit a lower marginal valuation 
for hunting areas too far-off. Generally, fewer attributes are significant 
for very low-priced hunting grounds. One possible explanation for this 
outcome is that lease prices in this segment can be associated with 
substantial discounts for hunters who have a close relationship with the 
landowner and when the lease is associated with other exchange of 
services (e.g., related to hunting effort, or the management of land, 
buildings, or equipment). 
To assess multicollinearity in the model, we study the correlation 
matrix and variance inflation factors (VIF) across covariates. The results, 
provided in Table A3, suggest that the three carnivore indices present a 
VIF lower than 2, and the correlation of each carnivore index with the 
other covariates never exceeds 52% (in absolute value). Thus, the key 
variables of interest are not highly collinear with each other or with the 
rest of covariates.12 
The varying effects of large carnivores and other characteristics 
along the lease price distribution justify the use of the quantile regres-
sion framework as opposed to OLS. Moreover, the heterogeneous im-
pacts of the CQR estimates exhibit very different patterns compared with 
the UQR coefficients (bold black lines Vs. blue lines in Figs. 2 and A2). 
Compared with CQR, the unconditional estimation applies to the overall 
distribution of the lease prices and the coefficient interpretation is 
relevant to the policy domain (Firpo et al., 2009; Borah & Basu, 2013). 
4.2. Marginal implicit prices 
We proceed to calculate the marginal implicit prices for the price 
segments in which carnivores have a statistically significant effect (i.e. 
mostly the middle range). Because we are interested in the marginal 
impact of carnivores along the whole distribution of lease prices, we 
only use the results from the UQR method to calculate the marginal 
values of each species. By taking Eq. (8), we could calculate the marginal 
implicit price of each carnivore for any population density index. 
However, a carnivore index unit is an ecological measure with limited 
economic interpretation. Therefore, we compute the marginal implicit 
prices in terms of carnivore territories (i.e. home ranges) and individual 
bears, instead of carnivore index units. Based on Eq. (8), the estimated 
marginal implicit price of an additional territory/individual of the j 

























, (8)  
where Bj is the number of territories (for wolf and lynx) or individuals 
(for bear). The term ∂Cj∂Bj in Eq. (8) refers to the change in the carnivore 
index corresponding to one additional home range (for lynx and wolf) or 
individual (for bear). 
In our sample, the average municipality area is 2 145 km2 and the 
size of a lynx buffer zone is 320 km2 (see data section); therefore, an 
increase in the lynx index corresponding to one additional home range 
(i.e. lynx buffer) is 0.1492 units (= 320 km2 / 2 145 km2). Hence, ∂Cj∂Bj =
0.1492, for j = lynx. Following Eq. (8), the marginal implicit price for 








1+Cj(0.1492). For instance, the marginal implicit price for the 50th 







= − 20.66 SEK/ha and year. Similarly, the calculation for the 50th 








1+2(0.1492)(0.1492) = − 18.28 SEK/ha and year, and so on. It can be 
noticed that the marginal values (in absolute terms) decrease as the 
number of buffer zones increase, see also Fig. 3(b). 
In a similar fashion as with the lynx, an increase in the wolf index 
corresponding to one additional wolf home range (which sizes 1 000 
km2, see data section) is 0.4662 units (= 1 000 km2 / 2 145 km2). Thus, 
the marginal implicit price for the τ th quantile of one additional wolf 








1+Cj(0.4662), where j = wolf . 
Because the brown bear index is measured in a different way 
Fig. 4. Regional distribution of the lynx’ marginal implicit prices per hunting 
ground, SEK per hectare and year. 
Notes: This graph corresponds to the distribution of marginal implicit prices of 
lynx for the 290 municipalities divided by region. We take the 50th uncondi-
tional quantile to make the calculations for each municipality. The colored 
values in the graph relate to the distributional mean of each region. 
11 For further insight on this Wald-type F test see Peeters et al. (2017) pp. 152.  
12 We also tried adding regional dummies to account for fixed effects in the 
three regions: Norrland, Svealand and Gotaland (base dummy). However, we 
did not include these as regressors in the final estimations, essentially because 
the carnivore distribution (i.e., the carnivore index regressors) describes and 
resembles this regional information. Namely, the wolf index is mostly non-zero 
when Svealand is equal to one, that is, 76% of the wolf observations are in 
Svealand. Similarly, the bear index is predominantly non-zero when Norrland is 
equal to one. Although Dalarna is a county that officially belongs to the 
Svealand region, it borders the Norrland region and hosts a fair amount of 
brown bears. The Norrland region together with Dalarna represent 64% of the 
bear (non-zero) observations. After including Svealand and Norrland in the 
main model, the dummies are non-significant, as well as the wolf and bear 
covariates. Moreover, the correlation between the Svealand dummy and the 
wolf index is 58%, and the correlation between the Norrland dummy and the 
bear index is 53%. 
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compared with the lynx and wolf, the procedure to calculate the term ∂Cj∂Bj 
is different.13 The most recent estimation of the bear population in 
Sweden is 2 782 from 2013 (Swenson et al. 2017). Because the average 
municipality area of our sample (2 145 km2) corresponds to 0.526% of 
the total size of Sweden (407 340 km2 excluding lakes), there are on 
average 14.65 bears per municipality (= 2 782 ∙ 0.526%). Thus, an 
increase in the average bear index corresponding to one additional bear 
in a municipality is 0.0084 units (= 0.12/14.65; Table 1), hence, ∂Cj∂Bj =
0.0084. The marginal implicit price for the τ th quantile of one addi-








1+Cj(0.0084), where j = bear. Fig. 3 
illustrates the marginal implicit price (expressed in absolute value) for 
the 50th and 60th unconditional quantiles as a function of carnivore 
territories/individuals, and compares this relationship with that ob-
tained from OLS. 
To provide one estimation of the economic cost of each carnivore 
species on hunting lease prices, we average the marginal implicit prices 
of the statistically significant unconditional quantiles (Table 3). In 
addition, we aggregate this result per carnivore territory (for wolf and 
lynx) and individual (for bear)14 . Given that the marginal implicit prices 
vary with the number of buffer zones and bear individuals, it is impor-
tant to clarify that we compute the marginal values of a change from 
zero to one home range, and from zero to one individual bear (as 
opposed to the change e.g. from one to two home ranges, or from four to 
five bears, etc). According to Table 3, the average marginal implicit 
price of a wolf territory is 20.3 SEK per hectare and year in the affected 
municipality. In proportional terms, this means that on average, an 
additional wolf home range reduces the mean hunting lease price by 
21% in the municipality where it is established.15 The corresponding 
impact of an additional lynx family group, and an additional brown 
bear, is a decrease in the mean hunting lease price by 22.4% and 0.6%, 
respectively, in the municipality where the establishment occurs. 
As a final exercise and given that the lynx is spread across the three 
regions in Sweden, we disaggregate the distribution of marginal implicit 
prices for lynx on a regional level16 (Fig. 4). To this end, we compute the 
marginal implicit price for each of the 290 municipalities at the 50th 
unconditional quantile (Table S1, Supplementary material). Based on 
these computations per municipality, we take the distributional mean of 
each region to calculate the associated marginal implicit price per lynx 
territory17 (Table 4). Besides the very high significance, the reason to 
take the 50th quantile for our calculations is that the range of significant 
quantiles (column 1 in Table 3) are not statistically different from each 
other according to the Wald-F pairwise-equality test18 . 
The regional distribution of marginal implicit prices of the lynx 
species coincides to some extent with the regional distribution of 
hunting lease prices per region (cf. Fig. 1). Namely, the marginal implicit 
price of an additional lynx territory is the highest in the region with 
higher lease prices (Gotaland), and the lowest in the least expensive 
region (Norrland). Furthermore, Fig. A3 (Appendix) illustrates 
geographically the marginal implicit prices for the 290 municipalities in 
Sweden for all carnivore species. 
5. Conclusion 
This study contributes to the literature by studying market segmen-
tation in the hunting sector, and the implications of such segmentation 
for the valuation of large carnivores. By using the unconditional quantile 
regression approach, we find differential effects of large carnivores on 
hunting lease prices when compared to the average impact obtained 
from ordinary least squares. These heterogeneous effects differ from 
Table 4 
Marginal implicit prices for lynx on a regional level, SEK per year.  
Region Average marginal implicit price (SEK 
ha− 1 yr− 1 in municipality of 
establishment) 
Average marginal implicit 
price (million SEK yr− 1 
territory− 1) 
Gotaland 22.4 3.70 
Svealand 21.2 3.50 
Norrland 19.9 3.28 
Notes: Exchange rate is 9.35 SEK per EUR, calculated as the average for years 
2014 and 2015 according to Central Bank of Sweden (Sveriges Riksbank). 
Fig. A1. Municipalities where the hunting areas of the study are located 
(painted in grey). 
Notes: The study comprises 323 hunting grounds distributed across 154 mu-
nicipalities (in grey) out of the total 290 municipalities in Sweden. 
13 The brown bear index is based on individual bears while the wolf and lynx 
indexes are based on buffer zones (i.e. home ranges), see data section.  
14 Because the average size of a municipality in this study is 214 500 hectares 
(i.e. 2 145 km2) and about 77% of the Swedish land territory is agricultural land 
or forest (Statistics Sweden), we assume that 165 200 ha (= 77%∙214 500 ha)
on average are suitable for hunting in a municipality of our dataset.  
15 Mean hunting lease price P=96.68 (Table 1).  
16 Wolves are mainly present in the Svealand region and the Västra Götaland 
and Gävleborg counties. Brown bears are mostly in the Norrland region and the 
Dalarna and Värmland counties.  
17 The 290 municipalities are distributed per region: 140 in Gotaland, 96 in 
Svealand and 54 in Norrland. 
18 This implies that we could actually take any unconditional quantile from 
the 48th to the 77th to make the calculation of marginal implicit prices per 
municipality. Or analogously, this means that there is no statistical difference 
across the significant quantiles. 
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those found with the conditional quantile method. According to our 
findings, large carnivores seemingly influence hunting lease prices 
negatively in the middle-range of the lease price distribution. Our results 
can be compared to Mensah et al. (2019) that takes 43 hunting plots in 
South Sweden and estimates that the average marginal implicit price of 
an additional lynx family group on hunting lease prices add up to EUR 
162 thousand per year. Comparatively, our estimations make use of a 
much greater dataset, comprising 323 hunting grounds and covering a 
remarkably bigger portion of the Swedish territory, and yield a higher 
impact of EUR 379 thousand for the subset of the lease market where the 
impact is significant. This suggests that the impact of hunting values are 
unequally distributed across space. 
Results indicate that the lower parts of the price distribution are 
plausibly unaffected by the presence of large carnivores. The lower price 
segment is generally insensitive to hunting plot attribute levels, poten-
tially because the lease payments could be merely a symbolic financial 
transfer among relatives and friends, or associated with other trans-
actions between the concerned parties. Also, the monetary transfers 
could be associated with informal agreements between land owner and 
hunters, e.g., on efforts to reduce game populations and hence browsing 
damage. Furthermore, it might be that hunters in this segment place a 
high value on having access to a hunting plot, independently of the at-
tributes, e.g., due to the benefits if being part of the hunting community. 
There are few observations with positive levels of wolf and brown 
bear in the upper price segments. This might explain the fact that im-
pacts of the two species on hunting rental prices are not significant for 
this part of the price distribution. The lynx is geographically more 
spread across Sweden. Although this species does not appear to 
influence the lower hunting rental prices, it has a significant effect at the 
10% level in the upper part of the price distribution. 
A limitation of our study is that we do not account for potential 
spatial spillovers on hunting lease prices provided that carnivore pres-
ence may influence hunting areas in neighboring municipalities. This 
spatial analysis could be developed in future research. Another limita-
tion is the omission of landscape variables at the hunting plot level, 
which has been found by some authors to contribute to hunting- 
transaction prices (Shrestha and Alavalapati, 2004; Martinez-Jauregui 
et al., 2015). In addition, a noticeable caveat is the relatively few 
number of carnivore observations in the higher quantiles of the hunting 
lease price distribution. A larger sample size is needed to examine 
further the effects of carnivore presence in those upper price segments. 
Our study was motivated by the need to identify conditions under 
which hunter-carnivore conflicts could be more pronounced. Results 
show the strongest impact on hunting lease prices in the mid-range of 
the price distribution. Given the considerable magnitude of the eco-
nomic impact of additional wolf and lynx territories in the mid-range of 
the distribution, the incentives for poaching could be higher in these 
price segments. Poaching is argued to be a major cause of mortality for 
wolf in Sweden (Liberg et al., 2020), and recent studies suggest that a 
considerable share of Danish hunters could be willing to undertake 
illegal measures towards wolf (Højberg et al., 2017) while about one 
fifth of Swedish hunters abstain from reporting others’ poaching 
(Peterson et al., 2019). Therefore, public resources for prevention and 
monitoring should be targeted towards price segments and locations 
where economic incentives and social acceptance for poaching are 
higher. Furthermore, our approach could be used to compare the 
Fig. A2. Quantile plots for the estimated coefficients of other attributes with statistical differences across the price distribution: (a) Size of hunting area, (b) forest 
productivity, and (c) distance to the nearest large city. 
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marginal implicit price of additional carnivores across larger regions 
when evaluating zoning policies. In this respect we could only establish 
differences in costs across the three large Swedish regions for the lynx. 
Even then, the difference in marginal implicit price between regions is 
small, suggesting that increases in the lynx population would affect 
hunting lease prices in a similar manner in different parts of the country. 
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Fig. A3. Marginal implicit prices (SEK ha− 1 year− 1) per municipality for (a) lynx, (b) wolf and (c) bear. 
Notes: The darkest municipalities have the lowest marginal implicit prices, which are those with the highest carnivore density. Each map is divided in three cat-
egories of equal-size intervals. 
Table A1 
Wald-F test for equality of UQR coefficients between the median quantile and the 
10th/90th quantile.  
UQR coefficient 50th Vs. 10th 50th Vs. 90th 
Large carnivores   
log_(1+wolf) z = 2.40 ** z = - 0.53  
P-value = 0.016 P-value = 0.594 
log_(1+lynx) z = 3.5 *** z = - 0.76  
P-value = 0.000 P-value = 0.45 
log_(1+bear) z = 2.60 *** z = 1.07  
P-value = 0.009 P-value = 0.284 
Other attributes   
log(area) z = 1.83 * z = - 1.94 *  
P-value = 0.068 P-value = 0.053 
forest_prod z = - 3.77 *** z = 0.61  
P-value = 0.000 P-value = 0.539 
log(nearcity) z = 2.40 ** z = - 0.55  
P-value = 0.016 P-value = 0.583 
Notes: The wolf index rejects the null hypothesis of pair-wise equality between 
the 10th quantile and the 50th quantile at the 5% level of significance, and both 
lynx and bear coefficients reject H0 with 1% level of significance. In contrast, 
none of the carnivore coefficients can reject the null hypothesis of pair-wise 
equality between the 90th quantile and the median quantile. Also, the table 
displays the other covariates for which there is statistical difference across un-
conditional quantiles. Size of hunting area exhibits heterogeneous effects among 
the 10th, 50th and 90th quantiles. The respective marginal effect of forest 
productivity and distance to the nearest large city is different between the 10th 
and the median, but such difference does not hold between the median and the 
90th quantile. 
Table A2 












Quantiles Number of (non-zero) observations 
0th - 20th 64 23 60 59 
20th - 40th 64 32 58 58 
40th - 60th 65 28 57 31 
60th - 80th 65 8 45 15 
80th-100th 65 16 38 19 
Total 323 107 258 182  
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Sjölander-Lindqvist, A., 2015. Targeted removal of wolves: analysis of the motives for 
controlled hunting. Wildlife Biol. 21 (3), 138–146. 
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